Journal article2025Honesty and cooperation in groups
The Hidden Costs of Whistleblower Protection
Review of Law & Economics 21(2), 535–560
In short
A lab experiment on whether protecting whistleblowers, by making reports more likely, also reduces cooperation between managers and employees.
What we find
- In a lab experiment, a manager and an employee can cooperate, and the employee can blow the whistle.
- Protecting whistleblowers can deter wrongdoing.
- When protection makes reporting more likely, it can also harm cooperation between managers and employees: a hidden cost of the policy.
Cite
Niklas Wallmeier and Timo Promann (2025). “The Hidden Costs of Whistleblower Protection.” Review of Law & Economics 21(2), 535–560. https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2024-0075
@article{wallmeier2025hidden,
author = {Wallmeier, Niklas and Promann, Timo},
title = {{The Hidden Costs of Whistleblower Protection}},
year = {2025},
journal = {Review of Law & Economics},
volume = {21},
number = {2},
pages = {535--560},
doi = {10.1515/rle-2024-0075}
}