Draft2026Expectations and forecasting
Ambiguity, Pessimism, and Firm Decisions: Evidence from Corporate Forecasts around Large Shocks
Only ambiguity gives the same answer for winners and losers of a shock. Pessimism and risk move or widen the number in the direction of the news, and firms hide only bad news. That difference is how the study tells ambiguity apart from the other explanations.
In short
When firms cannot put probabilities on the consequences of a shock, they may stop quantifying their forecasts instead of lowering them. A model, and a test on US annual reports around COVID-19, the war in Ukraine and the 2025 tariffs, contrasted with German firms that must publish forecasts by law.
What the model predicts
- Pessimism lowers the forecast, risk widens its range, and ambiguity changes its form.
- Under ambiguity, firms fall silent where forecasts are voluntary, as in the US. Where forecasts are mandatory, as in Germany, they leave the shock out, coarsen the forecast or add a reservation.
- This happens whether the shock is good or bad news for the firm. Pessimism and hiding bad news cannot produce that pattern.
- A firm that leaves the shock out keeps its old number but invests less, as if the worst case were true.
How I test it
Filing deadlines placed thousands of US annual reports just before or just after three shocks: COVID-19 (11 March 2020), the invasion of Ukraine (24 February 2022) and the tariff announcements of 2 April 2025. Which side of the date a report falls on is close to chance, so comparing the two sides shows what the shock did to the forecast. Matched German and European firms, which must publish forecasts by law, show what a mandate changes.
Pilot results
A pilot with the management reports of 45 German firms for fiscal 2021, around the invasion of Ukraine. Only four reports were signed before the invasion, and they come from large firms that close their books early, so the pilot illustrates the pattern but is not the main test. That runs on US filings.
- None of the 4 reports signed before the invasion mention the war; 38 of the 41 signed after it do, and the share rises with the time since the invasion.
- The most common response is to keep the pre-war number and leave the war out of it, or to add a reservation: 20 of 38 reports.
- Firms that stood to gain from the war, such as Rheinmetall and K+S, left it out just like firms that stood to lose.
- The more directly a firm was exposed, the more likely it changed the form of its forecast instead of naming the war only as a risk.
Cite
Niklas Wallmeier (2026). “Ambiguity, Pessimism, and Firm Decisions: Evidence from Corporate Forecasts around Large Shocks.” Work in progress.
@unpublished{wallmeier2026ambiguity,
author = {Wallmeier, Niklas},
title = {{Ambiguity, Pessimism, and Firm Decisions: Evidence from Corporate Forecasts around Large Shocks}},
year = {2026},
note = {Work in progress}
}